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Steilen,	Cass	Sunstein,	Andrew	K.	Woods	and	participants	 at	 the	Climenko	Reunion	
Workshop	 at	 Harvard	 Law	 School,	 the	Workshop	 on	 the	 Presidency	 at	 the	 Floers-
heimer	 Center	 for	 Constitutional	 Democracy	 at	 Cardozo	 Law	 School,	 faculty	 work-
shops	at	the	University	of	Arizona	and	the	University	of	New	Mexico,	the	Junior	Na-


















dicial	 “hard	 look	 review.”2	When	 an	 agency	 formally	 adjudicates,	 it	
must	use	trial-like	procedures,	including	providing	notice,	a	hearing,	
and	cross-examination	of	witnesses.3	The	decision	can	then	be	chal-
lenged	 in	 court	 to	 ensure	 it	 was	 based	 on	 “substantial	 evidence.”4	















the	 relevant	 evidence	 and	 drew	 rational	 inferences	 from	 it.	See,	 e.g.,	Motor	Vehicle	
Mfrs.	Ass’n	of	the	U.S.,	Inc.	v.	State	Farm	Mut.	Auto.	Ins.	Co.,	463	U.S.	29,	43	(1983)	(set-
ting	forth	the	standard	test	for	arbitrary	and	capricious	review	in	administrative	law).	






















right	 to	 do	whatever	 I	want	 as	 [P]resident.”7	 Of	 course,	 this	 is	 not	
true—there	are	substantive	limits	on	the	President’s	power.8	But	nei-

















	 6.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Kevin	M.	 Stack,	The	 Statutory	 President,	 90	 IOWA	L.	REV.	 539,	 552	
(2005)	 [hereinafter	 Stack,	 The	 Statutory	 President]	 (“In	 contrast	 to	 legislation	 or	
agency	regulation,	 there	are	almost	no	 legally	enforceable	procedural	requirements	
































throughout	 the	 economy	 upon	 finding	 that	 doing	 so	 was	
needed	to	“stabilize	the	economy,	reduce	inflation,	and	mini-
mize	unemployment.”11	
• The	President	 can	 impose	 regulations	 on	 government	 pro-
curement	contracts,	which	make	up	approximately	ten	per-
cent	 of	 gross	 domestic	 product,	 so	 long	 as	 she	 determines	
such	 regulations	 will	 promote	 “economy	 and	 efficiency	 in	
government	procurement.”12	
• The	President	can	close	or	take	over	telecommunications	sta-
tions,	 upon	 declaring	 a	 “national	 emergency”	 and	
“deem[ing]”	such	action	“necessary	in	the	interest	of	national	
security	or	defense.”13	







limited	 to	 foreign	affairs	or	other	areas	where	 the	President	has	 inherent	 constitu-
tional	authority).	
	 10.	 See	33	U.S.C.	§	1321(b)(3)–(4)	(describing	presidential	authority	for	regulat-
ing	oil	 and	hazardous	 substance	 liability);	42	U.S.C.	 §	9605	 (describing	 the	national	
contingency	plan).	








or	 tap	 the	 Strategic	 Petroleum	Reserve,	 implement	 energy	
conservation	 contingency	 plans,	 prohibit	 burning	 of	 petro-
leum	or	other	 fuels,	or	 increase	 fuel	production	 if	 she	con-
cludes	there	is	a	“severe	energy	supply	interruption.”14	




with	 the	proper	care	and	management	of	 the	objects	 to	be	
protected.”15		
• The	President	can	ban	the	entry	of	certain	classes	of	aliens	
from	entering	 the	United	 States	 so	 long	 as	 she	 determines	

























2111,	 2179	 (2019);	 Evan	 D.	 Bernick,	 Faithful	 Execution:	Where	 Administrative	 Law	
Meets	the	Constitution,	108	GEO.	L.J.	1,	5	(2019).	These	conceptions	certainly	support	
the	duty	discussed	below.	But	even	if	one	accepts	that	these	terms	bind	the	President—
and	 I	 have	 also	 suggested	 similar	 obligations	 can	 be	 derived	 from	 the	 Take	 Care	
Clause’s	text,	see	Shalev	Roisman,	Presidential	Factfinding,	72	VAND.	L.	REV.	825,	855–
56	(2019)—it	is	hard	to	know	what	such	requirements	mean	concretely	for	regulating	
the	President	 today	without	evaluating	other	sources	of	 law.	To	help	 flesh	out	such	








exercises	 of	 power—ranging	 from	 cases	 on	 the	 nondelegation	 doc-
trine,	 to	 deference	 to	 presidential	 judgment,	 to	 the	 presumption	 of	




































































































gated,	 at	 least	 absent	 some	 emergency	 circumstance.	 Such	 inter-
agency	review	is	already	common	practice,	but	it	 is	not	required	by	
the	formal	order	governing	such	directives,	and	it	is	not	always	con-
ducted.	 Imposing	 such	 a	 formal	 requirement	would	 thus	 likely	 im-
prove	compliance	with	the	duty	to	deliberate.28		
Identifying	the	duty	to	deliberate	also	helps	illuminate	a	perplex-

























president’s	 directives,	 considering	 them	 insufficiently	 thought	 through.”	Dexter	 Fil-









Identifying	 the	 duty	 to	 deliberate	 thus	 reveals	what	 the	 Presi-







So,	how	do	we	evaluate	 the	 legitimacy	of	 the	President’s	exercising	











influencing	 agency	 conduct	 are	 uncomfortable	with	 the	 idea	 of	 the	
President	exercising	analogous	power	on	her	own	without	abiding	by	







ally	 regulates	 such	 delegations,	 and	 a	 better	 understanding	 of	why	
Congress	delegates	power	to	the	President,	rather	than	agency	heads,	






	 31.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Elena	 Kagan,	 Presidential	 Administration,	 114	 HARV.	 L.	REV.	 2245	









import	of	 identifying	the	President’s	procedural	duties	 into	relief.	 If	
the	President	truly	has	no	procedural	obligations	in	exercising	power,	
then	the	President	could	issue	environmental	regulations,	ration	en-
ergy	 consumption,	 seize	 private	 property,	 classify	 information,	 use	





ily—that	 she	has	no	procedural	 obligations—seems	hard	 to	 square	
with	an	office	of	the	presidency	limited	by	law	that	our	Constitution	
contemplates.33	 This	 Article	 seeks	 to	 make	 headway	 in	 identifying	





























ident	 for	 a	 number	 of	 reasons,	 including	 enabling	 better	 public	 accountability,	








































































ing	 that	 the	 relevant	 “‘entity	 possesses	 the	 qualifications	 for	 state-
hood,’	 including	 a	 defined	 territory,	 permanent	 population,	





























is	 simply	 that	 the	President	has	numerous	 substantive	powers	 that	
derive	from	the	Constitution.		
B. STATUTORY	POWERS	
What	has	 received	 far	 less	 attention	 than	 the	breadth	of	 these	






































inconsequential	 issues,	 foreign	 affairs,	 or	military	 authorities.48	 Ra-
ther,	direct	delegations	to	the	President	span	all	manner	of	substan-
tive	areas	 including	 trade,	disaster	and	emergency	management,	 as	
well	as	purely	domestic	powers	like	combating	domestic	inflation,	set-












Price	 Stabilization	 Powers—The	 President	 has	 often	 possessed	
the	 power	 to	 prevent	 inflation	 and	 stabilize	 prices	 in	 the	 domestic	
economy.49	For	example,	the	Economic	Stabilization	Act	of	1970	gave	
 


















































































haps	most	 consequentially,	 the	 President	 has	 the	 power	 to	 impose	














numerous	powers	 relating	 to	government	employees.	 She	 is	 tasked	
with	 issuing	 regulations	 governing	 admission	 into	 the	 civil	 service	
that	“will	best	promote	the	efficiency	of	that	service,”	and	in	particular	
she	 has	 the	 power	 to	 “ascertain	 the	 fitness	 of	 applicants	 as	 to	 age,	




















































plies,”	 as	well	 as	methods	 to	 “identify[],	 remov[e],	 or	 remedy[]	 re-
leases	 of	 hazardous	 substances.”71	 The	 President	 has	 a	 separate	
















has	a	 range	of	powers	 to	exempt	 federal	 agencies	 from	compliance	
with	various	environmental	regulations	if	she	determines	doing	so	is	
in	the	“paramount	interest	of	the	United	States.”73		
Apart	 from	these	environmental	powers,	 the	President	has	 the	
power	 to	create	national	monuments	by	proclaiming	 that	 there	are	
“historic	 landmarks”	or	 “other	objects	of	historic	or	scientific	 inter-
est	.	.	.	 situated	on	 land	owned	or	controlled	by	the	Federal	Govern-














The	President	 also	has	 agriculture-related	powers,	 such	 as	 the	
authority	to	dispose	of	commodity	set-asides	through	various	means,	
including	“donation	to	school-lunch	programs.”78		
Domestic	 Emergencies—While	 it	 is	 now	 relatively	 well-known	
that	the	President	has	power	to	respond	to	foreign-based	emergen-
cies,	she	also	has	authority	to	respond	to	domestic	emergencies.	The	
President	 can	declare	 a	 “severe	 energy	 supply	 interruption,”	 giving	
 
	 72.	 33	U.S.C.	§§	2711–2712,	2713(e)–(f).	The	President	can	also	assess	civil	pen-
alties	on	shipping	vessels	 that	carry	 inadequate	 insurance	upon	taking	 into	account	





























provide	 medical,	 dental,	 childcare,	 funeral,	 and	 transportation	 ex-
penses	to	those	adversely	affected	by	a	major	disaster.84		
If	 the	 President	 determines	 there	 is	 a	 “major	 violent	 crime	 or	
drug-related	emergency,”	the	President	can	send	federal	“personnel,	
equipment,	supplies,	facilities,	financial	assistance”	and	provide	“law	




thorities.	 As	 made	 famous	 by	 President	 Trump’s	 “Travel	 Ban,”	 the	

































tain	 findings,	 such	as	 that	 the	aid	will	help	alleviate	hunger	or	stop	
malaria.90		
In	 terms	of	military	powers,	 the	President	 can	waive	 statutory	
limits	on	military	end	strength	if	she	declares	an	emergency,91	waive	
requirements	for	appointing	combatant	commanders	in	a	number	of	
different	 services,92	 and	 issue	 regulations	 governing	 disability	 and	

























































States	 business	 or	 its	 assets	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 covered	 transaction	
might	take	action	that	threatens	to	impair	the	national	security.”101	
And	as	is	now	relatively	well-known,	the	President	has	enormous	

















wartime.102	 For	 example,	 under	 the	 International	 Emergency	 Eco-
nomic	Powers	Act,	the	President	can	regulate	or	prohibit	foreign	ex-













States	 balance-of-payment	 deficits”	 or	 prevent	 depreciation	 of	 the	
dollar.106	And	the	President	can	designate	countries	“beneficiary	de-
veloping	countries”	granting	them	preferential	treatment.107	Finally,	








	 102.	 Elizabeth	Goitein,	The	Alarming	Scope	of	 the	President’s	Emergency	Powers,	



































information.112	 It	 is	 to	 suggest	 the	 President	 can	 ration	 energy	 use	











capricious”	 review.	See,	 e.g.,	 5	U.S.C.	 §	706(2)(A);	Motor	Vehicle	Mfrs.	Ass’n	 v.	 State	
Farm	Mut.	Auto.	Ins.	Co.,	463	U.S.	29	(1983)	(discussing	standard	test	for	“arbitrary	
and	 capricious”	 review).	 Rather,	 I	 use	 the	 word	 in	 its	 ordinary	 sense	 in	 common	
speech—to	mean	that	a	choice	was	made	essentially	at	random	or	based	on	personal	
whim,	rather	than	based	on	reason,	reasonable	process,	or	consideration.	See,	e.g.,	Ar-





























obligations.	And,	 it	 turns	out	 that	 they	say	quite	a	 lot.	Although	 the	
Court	has	not	addressed	the	President’s	procedural	obligations	explic-






formation	 and	 making	 a	 considered	 judgment	 before	 exercising	
power.	Below,	I	first	show	how	the	text	supports	such	a	duty,	then	fo-
cus	primarily	 on	how	Supreme	Court	 precedent	 supports	 it,	 before	





The	 text	 of	 the	 Constitution	 suggests	 the	 President	 has	 proce-
dural	obligations	in	exercising	power.	The	Take	Care	Clause	requires	
that	 the	 President	 “shall	 take	 care	 that	 the	 Laws	 be	 faithfully	 exe-














done	 “diligently”	 or	 “care[fully].”117	 From	 this	we	might	 easily	 con-
clude	that	if	there	is	a	duty	to	exercise	power	“diligently,”	“care[fully],”	














be	deprived	of	 life,	 liberty,	or	property,	without	due	process	of	 law.”).	Because	I	am	
















	 118.	 I	 have	made	 an	 analogous	 argument	 relating	 to	 the	 President’s	 finding	 of	
predicate	 facts	 but	 excluded	 the	 exercise	 of	 policy	 judgment	 from	 the	 analysis.	See	
Roisman,	supra	note	18,	at	856	(“This	requirement	of	‘performance’	or	‘exact[itude]’	















attach	 to	 it	 support	 some	 procedural	 duties—including	 a	 duty	 to	
gather	 information	and	make	a	considered	judgment	based	on	such	
information—the	 terms	 of	 the	 Take	 Care	 Clause	 are	 famously	
vague.122	 As	 much	 as	 they	might	 support	 a	 duty	 to	 deliberate—or	


























opinion)	 of	 a	 principal	 officer,	 because	 faithful	 execution	would	 not	 require	 such	 a	
written	opinion.	So,	while	it	is	true	that	neither	the	Opinions	Clause	nor	the	Take	Care	























































































which	 wise	 and	 useful	 legislation	 must	 depend	 which	 cannot	 be	
known	to	the	law-making	power,	and	must	therefore	be	a	subject	of	
inquiry	and	determination	outside	of	the	halls	of	legislation.”128	Again,	
the	Court	 clearly	 assumed	 the	President	would	 engage	 in	 “inquiry”	

































This	 requirement	 is	 also	 supported	 by	Panama	 Refining	 Co.	 v.	
Ryan,	where	the	Court	invalidated	a	delegation	to	ban	transport	of	so-






























determine	whether	 the	 conditions	 in	 that	 particular	 industry	were	
such	at	any	given	time	as	to	make	restriction	helpful	to	the	declared	






























representative	of	 the	Government.”);	Opp	Cotton	Mills,	 Inc.	 v.	Adm’r	of	 the	Wage	&	
Hour	Div.	of	the	Dep’t	of	Lab.,	312	U.S.	126,	145	(1941)	(“Th[e]	essentials	[of	the	legis-
lative	 function]	are	preserved	when	Congress	specifies	 the	basic	conclusions	of	 fact	
upon	 ascertainment	 of	 which,	 from	 relevant	 data	 by	 a	 designated	 administrative	


































make	 a	 considered	 judgment	 before	 exercising	 power.	 It	makes	 no	
 
making	department	to	ascertain	and	declare	the	event	upon	which	its	expressed	will	

































dition	 to	exercise	power,	 she	must	gather	relevant	 information	and	











terman	 Steamship	 Corp.	 is	 illustrative.143	 There,	 the	 Court	 found	 it	
could	 not	 review	 the	 President’s	 disagreement	 with	 a	 Civil	 Aero-
nautics	Board’s	recommendation	that	it	would	serve	the	public	inter-
est	to	deny	a	certificate	authorizing	an	air	route	to	a	particular	com-






































cial	 effect	 upon	 the	 reestablishment	 of	 peace	 in	 the	 affected	 coun-
tries.”150	 Of	 course,	 the	 Court	 was	 envisioning	 that	 such	 a	 “deter-









fairs,	 the	courts	simply	 lack	the	relevant	 information	and	expertise	 to	second-guess	
determinations	made	by	the	President	based	on	information	properly	withheld.	Sec-
ond,	 even	 if	 the	 courts	 could	 compel	 the	Executive	 to	produce	 the	necessary	 infor-




































President	 might	 decide	 that	 there	 is	 imminent	 danger	 of	 invasion,	
might	be	of	a	nature	not	constituting	strict	technical	proof,	or	the	dis-
closure	of	the	evidence	might	reveal	important	secrets	of	state,	which	
the	public	 interest	 .	.	.	might	 imperiously	demand	to	be	kept	 in	con-
cealment.”154	 The	 Court	 noted	 the	 President	 “is	 necessarily	 consti-
tuted	the	judge	of	the	existence	of	the	exigency	in	the	first	instance,	
and	is	bound	to	act	according	to	his	belief	of	the	facts.”155	The	Court	






































formed	 judgment	based	on	 it.	Otherwise,	protecting	 this	 interest	as	
“necessary”	for	governance	does	not	make	sense.159		
Indeed,	 as	 Justice	Rehnquist	 put	 it	 in	dissent,	 “[g]iven	 the	 vast	



























for	 protection	 of	 the	 public	 interest	 in	 candid,	 objective,	 and	 even	
blunt	 or	 harsh	 opinions	 in	 Presidential	 decisionmaking.”164	 As	 the	
Court	summed	it	up,	executive	privilege	serves	“the	valid	need	for	pro-
tection	 of	 communications	 between	 high	 Government	 officials	 and	
those	who	advise	and	assist	them	in	the	performance	of	their	manifold	

























































	 169.	 See	U.S.	CONST.	art	 I,	§	7	(	 “Every	Bill	which	shall	have	passed	the	House	of	



























United	 States.”	 The	 President	 has	 undoubtedly	 fulfilled	 that	 requirement	
here.	He	first	ordered	DHS	and	other	agencies	to	conduct	a	comprehensive	eval-
uation	of	every	single	country’s	compliance	with	the	information	and	risk	as-























Although	 the	 Court’s	 review	 of	 the	 Establishment	 Clause	 chal-
lenge	later	in	the	opinion	raises	distinct	issues	from	the	question	of	




light	 of	 changing	 political	 and	 economic	 circumstances,’	 such	 judg-




	 173.	 Trump,	 138	 S.	 Ct.	 at	 2408–09	 (emphasis	 added)	 (first	 quoting	 8	 U.S.C.	
§	1182(f);	then	quoting	Proclamation	9723,	83	Fed.	Reg.	15,937	(Apr.	10,	2018)).	
	 174.	 See,	e.g.,	id.	at	2404–05	(“After	consulting	with	multiple	Cabinet	members	and	



























dent’s	 exercise	 of	 power	 under	 a	 delegation	 requiring	 only	 that	 he	
“find”	entry	“detrimental	to	the	interests	of	the	United	States”	as	jus-
tified	precisely	because	the	President	engaged	in	a	“worldwide”	inter-
agency	 process	 of	 information	 gathering	 and	 internal	 executive	
































It	 seems	 implausible	 to	 read	 the	 cases	as	 suggesting	 that	 the	Court	
would	have	upheld	the	delegations	if	the	President	had	argued	that	he	
could	or	did	find	these	conditions—which	again	were	necessary	fea-
tures	 of	 upholding	 the	 delegations—satisfied	 arbitrarily,	 without	
gathering	 any	 information	 or	making	 a	 considered	 judgment.180	 In	
other	words,	the	President’s	deliberation	in	finding	the	condition	was	
a	 necessary	 feature	 of	 upholding	 the	 delegations—if	 the	 President	
could	find	the	conditions	arbitrarily,	the	conditions	that	made	the	leg-








Constitution.	 For	 example,	 the	national	 security	deference	 and	pre-
sumption	of	 regularity	doctrines’	 raison	 d’etre	 is	 the	belief	 that	 the	










































would	 have	 thought	 to	 argue—whether	 the	 President	 can	 exercise	






















































make	 a	 considered	 judgment	 on	 that	 information	before	 exercising	
power.	The	President	must	deliberate	before	exercising	power.	
C. EXECUTIVE	BRANCH	INTERPRETATION	



































































ing	 a	 duty	 to	 gather	 information	 and	make	 a	 considered	 judgment	
based	upon	it	in	order	to	exercise	the	President’s	appointment	author-
ity.	
In	keeping	with	 this	 conception,	 in	1856,	 the	Attorney	General	
concluded	the	President	could	not	send	federal	military	aid	to	the	gov-













President	 could	 call	 forth	 the	militia	 pursuant	 to	 a	 finding	 that	 the	
laws	of	the	United	States	could	not	be	enforced	by	ordinary	judicial	
proceedings,	 their	 “incapacity	 to	 cope	 with	 the	 power	 opposed	 to	


















Arkansas	 asked	 the	President	 for	 federal	 assistance	 to	 combat	 “do-











sertion,	 any	 officer	who	 is	 now	 .	.	.	 absent	 from	 duty	 three	months	














Congress	 “proceeded	 on	 the	 idea	 that	 the	 evidence	 which	 would	
chiefly,	 if	 not	 exclusively,	 guide	 the	 judgment	 of	 the	 President	 in	
awarding	 ‘medals	 of	 honor’	would	 be	 the	 official	 reports	 of	 battles	


























mines	 in	 Germany,	 and	 ascertain	 therefrom	whether	 this	 provision	 of	 the	
German	law	must	and	does	in	fact	work	a	discrimination	against	the	United	
States.198		
The	 Attorney	 General	 added	 that	 in	making	 the	 determination	 the	


















	 198.	 Potash	Mined	 in	Ger.—Antitrust	L.—Discriminatory	Exp.	Duty,	31	Op.	Att’y	
Gen.	545,	556–57	(1910)	(emphasis	added).	
	 199.	 Id.	at	546.	
	 200.	 See,	 e.g.,	 Tariff	 Comm’n—Investigation	 in	 Respect	 to	 Duty	 on	 Logs	 of	 Fir,	
Spruce,	Etc.,	34	Op.	Att’y	Gen.	77,	80	(1924)	(“As	to	such	importations,	therefore,	it	is	














of	 law.”202	 Katzenbach	 thus	 suggested	 the	 President	 had	 a	 duty	 to	


























	 203.	 Testimonial	 Immunity	Before	Cong.	of	 the	Former	Couns.	 to	 the	President,	
2019	WL	2315338,	at	*2	(O.L.C.	May	20,	2019);	Immunity	of	the	Assistant	to	the	Pres-

































respect	 to	 the	President’s	 use	of	military	 force	 in	 Syria,	OLC	 stated	
“[w]e	would	not	expect	that	any	President	would	use	[the]	power	[of	
the	armed	forces]	without	a	substantial	basis	for	believing	that	a	pro-
posed	operation	 is	necessary	 to	 advance	 important	 interests	of	 the	
Nation.”209	And,	regarding	releasing	records	relating	to	John	F.	Ken-
nedy’s	 assassination,	OLC	noted	 that,	 if	 the	President	did	not	make	
group-level	decisions	 about	what	 should	be	 released,	 he	 “would	be	
forced	to	evaluate	the	individual	justifications	for	postponing	tens	of	
thousands	 of	 records	 on	 a	 compressed	 timetable	without	 adequate	
time	for	full	consideration,”	again	suggesting	that	the	President	has	a	







































ities—as	 it	 is	 typically,	 although	 not	 universally,	 understood—then	
the	duty	 to	be	conscientious	and	execute	 the	 law	without	 failure	of	
performance	applies	to	constitutional	authorities.213	And,	in	terms	of	
Supreme	 Court	 precedent	 outside	 of	 the	 nondelegation	 space,	 alt-
hough	many	of	the	cases	discussed	above	related	to	statutory	author-
ities,	not	all	did.	For	example,	the	executive	privilege	cases	are	prem-















with	 foreign	 powers,	 direction	 of	 the	military	 as	 Commander	 in	 Chief—it	 is	 by	 no	
















Before	 explaining	 how	 the	 duty	 might	 best	 be	 enforced,	 it	 is	
worth	addressing	briefly	what	the	duty	to	deliberate	might	entail	in	
concrete	 terms.	First,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 recognize	 that	 the	duty	 is	a	
standard.	The	duty	to	deliberate	requires	that	if	a	power	is	contingent	
on	finding	a	certain	condition,	the	President	must	find	that	condition	


















	 218.	 See,	e.g.,	 Jewels	of	 the	Princess	of	Orange,	2	Op.	Att’y	Gen.	482,	489	(1831)	
(regarding	 Take	 Care	 Clause	 obligations);	 Pardoning	 Power	 of	 the	 President,	 6	Op.	
Att’y	Gen.	20,	21	(1853)	(regarding	the	pardon	power);	Governorship	of	Ark.,	14	Op.	












House	when	 “the	weather	outside	 is	 conducive	 to	 the	parks’	 enjoy-
ment.”	Exercising	such	power	is	not	purely	discretionary—the	Presi-
dent	has	to	find	the	weather	is	a	certain	way,	thus	the	power	is	condi-
tional	 and	 deliberation	 is	 required.	 But	 the	 deliberation	 could	 be	














ering	 this	 information,	 the	 President	 would	 then	 have	 to	 consider	









	 220.	 Or	 at	 least	 no	modern	President	would	 have	 had	 this	 information	 at	 hand	
without	having	to	engage	in	fact-gathering.	
	 221.	 Conceivably	 she	 could	 ask	 people	 outside	 her	 administration	 as	 well.	 The	
point	is	she	has	to	gather	information	and	consider	it	before	exercising	the	power.	
	 222.	 See	Marshall	Field	&	Co.,	143	U.S.	at	688.	












defense	 interest	 of	 the	 United	 States,”225	 or	 that	 exempting	 certain	
governmental	conduct	from	regulations	will	be	in	the	“paramount	in-
terest	 of	 the	United	States.”226	 These	 are	of	 course	 relatively	broad	
findings	but	would	still	require	the	President	to	deliberate.	She	would	
have	 to	 find	out	what	 the	 likely	 effect	 of	 taking	 the	 relevant	 action	

























































engage	 in	 record-keeping	 and	 at	 least	 some	 technocratic	 justifica-
tion.229	Almost	forty	years	ago,	Harold	Bruff	suggested	a	heightened	





















through	 in	 camera	procedures.”);	 id.	 at	 59–60	 (suggesting	 an	 “explanation	 require-
ment”).	
	 231.	 See	Manheim	&	Watts,	supra	note	19,	at	1812,	1814	(“[W]e	do	not	believe	that	
it	would	 be	 advisable	 for	 the	 courts	 to	 blindly	 transfer	 either	 administrative	 law’s	
many	complex	deference	doctrines	or	the	legislative	arena’s	highly	deferential	ration-






to	 “so	 long	 as	 the	 decisional	 factors	 that	 the	 president	 relied	 upon	
were	not	legally	foreclosed	by	[]	statute[]	or	the	Constitution,	and	so	
long	as	any	factual	justifications	had	adequate	support.”232		





versions	 of	 hard	 look	 review.233	 But	 while	 these	 accounts	 are	 un-
doubtedly	 valuable	 and	 important,	 the	 existing	 debate	 over	 which	
form	of	judicial	review	is	optimal	seems	intractable	without	resort	to	














































mally	 necessary	 to	 enforce	 the	 President’s	 existing	 procedural	 du-
ties.236		










fered	 from	 the	 list	 in	 the	 first	 version.238	 This	was	 of	 course	 enor-
mously	impactful	for	citizens	of	the	countries	taken	off	or	added	to	the	
list.	 In	 short,	 interagency	process	and	deliberation	are	often	 conse-
quential,	even	in	instances	where	they	do	not	change	the	bottom-line	

















13,209	(Mar.	6,	2017).	The	 third	version	added	Chad	and	Venezuela	 to	 this	 list.	See	
Proclamation	No.	9645,	82	Fed.	Reg.	45,161	(Sept.	24,	2017).	
	 239.	 See,	e.g.,	Steilen,	supra	note	32,	at	507–08	(“A	statutory	regime	mandating	in-








































































The	bottom	 line	 is	 that	 the	President’s	 existing	positive	proce-
dural	obligations	do	not	require	record-keeping	and	detailed	techno-
cratic	 justification.	And,	 even	 if	we	normatively	desire	more	proce-


























































2369.	Manheim	and	Watts	suggest	 judicial	 review	of	presidential	orders	 is	 likely	 to	
increase	going	forward,	see,	e.g.,	Manheim	&	Watts,	supra	note	19,	at	1748,	which	may	






433	(2009)	(“Presidents	 frequently	support	 imposition	of	 internal	mechanisms	that	
























reforms	are	 seen	as	necessary	 to	 comply	with	 legal	obligations,	 the	
more	likely	they	are	to	be	complied	with	given	the	pervasiveness	of	
legal	review	within	the	executive	branch.246	
What	 might	 these	 reforms	 look	 like?	 There	 are	 two	 relatively	
straightforward	ways	the	President	could	 improve	compliance	with	










‘oh,	by	 the	way	 .	.	.’	decisions,	made	on	 the	 fly	 in	 informal	bilateral	encounters	with	
administration	officials.”).	




go	unvetted	by	 lawyers,	 and	agency	 lawyers	often	wield	 substantial	power	 .	.	.	 over	
agency	policy.”).	
	 247.	 See	Renan,	supra	note	19,	at	2221–30	(describing	a	“deliberative	presidency”	
norm	 that	 serves	 to	 “render	 the	 exercise	 of	 presidential	 judgment	 nonarbitrary”);	




























course,	 the	President	would	have	 to	be	wary	of	making	 this	review	
process	 overly	 burdensome.255	 For	 example,	 true	 emergency	 situa-










































Although	 this	 solution	might	 seem	 unnecessary,	 recent	 events	
during	the	Trump	administration	suggest	otherwise.	There	have	been	
numerous	 examples	 of	 President	Trump	 seeking	 to	 exercise	power	




















a	number	of	occasions	that	 the	defense	secretary	at	 the	time,	 James	Mattis,	 ignored	
direction	from	the	White	House.	He	also	refused	to	send	defense	department	officials	
to	a	planned	Korea	war	game	at	Camp	David	in	the	autumn	of	2017,	or	to	provide	mil-











Trump’s	order	 to	 fire	 the	Ambassador	 to	Ukraine	was	not	 followed	
through	on	for	over	a	year.260	And	former	Secretary	of	Defense	James	
Mattis	 reportedly	 repeatedly	 “simply	 ignored	 the	President’s	 direc-
tives,	considering	them	insufficiently	thought	through.”261		


























	 260.	 Katherine	Faulders,	John	Santucci,	Allison	Pecorin	&	Olivia	Rubin,	 ‘Take	Her	
Out’:	Recording	Appears	to	Capture	Trump	at	Private	Dinner	Saying	He	Wants	Ukraine	
Ambassador	 Fired,	 ABC	 NEWS	 (Jan.	 24,	 2020,	 9:04	 PM),	 https://abcnews.go.com/	
Politics/recording-appears-capture-trump-private-dinner-ukraine-ambassador/	















fects	 the	 final	 product,	 even	when	 the	 ultimate	 outcome	 is	 foreor-






orders	 could	 be	 quite	 sticky,	 as	 the	 existing	 orders	 formalizing	 the	
process	for	executive	orders	and	proclamations	have	been.264		










exercise	power—such	 as	 finding	 that	 certain	 conduct	 is	 in	 the	 “na-
tional	 security”	 interest	 or	 the	 “paramount	 interest	 of	 the	 United	
States,”—barring	some	emergency	or	other	good	cause,	the	President	
can	 only	 make	 that	 determination	 after	 gathering	 relevant	 infor-
mation	 and	 consulting	 subject-matter	 experts	 within	 the	 executive	
branch.	


















durally	 regulating	 the	President’s	exercise	of	power,268	 it	has	never	
stated	 such	 procedural	 regulation	 is	 impermissible.269	 And,	 in	 fact,	
Congress	 routinely	 regulates	 how	 the	President	 exercises	 statutory	
power	procedurally.270	I	am	not	aware	of	anyone	suggesting	that	the	



























historic	 landmarks	 .	.	.	 that	are	situated	on	 land	owned	or	controlled	by	the	Federal	
Government	to	be	national	monuments.”).	
	 272.	 See,	e.g.,	 J.W.	Hampton,	 Jr.,	&	Co.	v.	United	States,	276	U.S.	394,	405	(1928)	
(“[B]efore	the	President	reaches	a	conclusion	on	the	subject	of	investigation	[delegated	
to	him],	the	Tariff	Commission	must	make	an	investigation,	and	in	doing	so	must	give	





(emphasis	 added));	 Fed.	 Energy	 Admin.	 v.	 Algonquin	 SNG,	 Inc.,	 426	 U.S.	 548,	 559	






































review	under	 this	 statutory	 scheme	 than	 if	 Congress	 itself	 had	exercised	 that	 judg-
ment.”	(emphasis	added)).	
	 274.	 See,	e.g.,	Kagan,	supra	note	31,	at	2365	(“The	awesome	substantive	breadth	of	







[the]	 influence	[of	procedure]	 in	Schechter	Poultry	v.	United	States,	where	 the	Court	






















in	 certain	 instances.	 This	 would	 depend	 on	 standard	 separation	 of	
powers	 balancing,	 which	 requires	 determining	 whether	 Congress’s	
procedural	 requirements	 “prevent[]	 the	 Executive	 Branch	 from	 ac-




























[https://perma.cc/L6Z2-FAEG]	 (“DOD’s	 constitutional	 analysis	 [stated]:	 .	.	.	 [E]ven	
though,	as	a	general	matter,	Congress	had	authority	under	its	constitutional	powers	













































to	 regulate	 the	 conduct	 of	 such	 surveillance	 by	 legislating	 a	 reasonable	 procedure,	











justify	 the	 vast	 power	 exercised	 by	 administrative	 agencies.285	 It	
started	by	seeking	to	legitimate	such	power	by	conceiving	of	agencies	
as	 serving	 as	mere	 “transmission	 belt[s]”	 for	 Congress’s	 desires.286	
When	this	theory	became	untenable,	it	was	replaced	by	a	model	that	
legitimated	agency	power	based	on	agency	“expertise.”287	And,	when	
that	 failed,	administrative	power	was	 justified	based	on	a	 theory	of	
“interest	representation.”288	Finally,	when	that	model	failed,	adminis-
trative	 law	scholars	sought	 to	 legitimate	agency	power	 through	 the	









































































STUD.	 L.	 9,	 22–23	 (1992)	 (discussing	 the	problematic	nature	of	 the	President	being	
both	“omnipowered	and	omnicompetent”).	
	 293.	 See,	e.g.,	Bressman,	supra	note	274	(explaining	how	a	President’s	accountabil-











Put	 simply,	 if	 we	 take	 seriously	 the	 concerns	 with	 executive	





more	 procedures	 before	 legitimately	 exercising	 power,	 it	 seems	
doubtful	 that	 the	President	 can	 legitimately	 exercise	all	 the	 powers	
delegated	 to	 her—over	 the	 environment,	 domestic	 prices,	 immigra-
tion,	government	regulation,	and	so	on—solely	by	engaging	in	internal	
deliberation	and	reasoned	consideration.296		















cerns	 that	 remain	notwithstanding	 the	President’s	 role	 in	 administration,	might	 be	
particularly	concerned.	See	generally	Bressman,	supra	note	274.	
	 297.	 As	noted	above,	supra	note	284,	Kathryn	Kovacs	has	argued	that	we	ought	to	
apply	 the	 APA’s	 procedural	 requirements	 to	 the	 President	 both	 as	 a	matter	 of	 the	
proper	interpretation	of	the	APA	and	for	a	number	of	normative	reasons	relating	to	
public	 participation,	 political	 accountability,	 transparency,	 deliberation,	 and	 uni-
formity.	See	generally	Kovacs,	supra	note	5,	at	97–106.	However,	if	the	Supreme	Court	
does	not	overturn	Franklin	v.	Massachusetts	and	apply	the	APA	to	the	President,	then	
conceptualizing	 the	 optimal	 procedure	 for	 the	 President	 allows	 us	 to	 start	 from	






















































(describing	 the	 difficulty	 of	 holding	 a	 President	 accountable	 given	 low-information	
voting,	infrequency	of	elections,	and	breadth	of	issues);	Jerry	L.	Mashaw	&	David	Berke,	











the	 typical	 procedural	 requirements	 of	 the	 APA.	 But	 no	 one	 has	


















simply	 applied	 to	 a	 different	 actor.	 Perhaps	 no	 administrative	 law	














































































delegations,	 we	might	 wish	 the	 procedures	 to	 vary	 by	 substantive	
area.	Unlike	administrative	law,	the	procedural	requirements	on	the	
President	need	not	be	trans-substantive.	Perhaps	we	would	want	one	









power	 delegated	 directly	 to	 her.	 But	 to	 make	 progress	 in	 that	 en-
deavor,	it	would	help	to	know	more	about	when	the	President	is	dele-
gated	such	power,	why	such	delegations	exist,	and	how	Congress	cur-














	 316.	 The	distinction	between	 regularized	oversight	 and	one-off	 regulations	was	
one	of	the	grounds	upon	which	the	Attorney	General’s	Committee	on	Administrative	
Procedure	suggested	that	delegations	to	the	President,	rather	than	agencies,	might	be	












ercise	 such	 power,	we	 know	 very	 little	 about	what	 procedures	 the	
President	must	go	through	before	exercising	power.	The	question	is	
not	what	administrative	law	requires	but	what	a	body	of	presidential	
law	 requires.	This	Article	argues	that	 this	body	of	 law	has	bite.	The	
President	must	gather	relevant	 information	and	make	a	considered	
judgment	 based	 on	 it	 before	 exercising	 power.	 In	 other	words,	 the	
President	must	deliberate.	Identifying	this	duty	can	help	clarify	recent	
debates	about	how	courts	ought	 to	review	presidential	exercises	of	
power	as	well	 as	 illuminate	how	 the	President	and	Congress	might	
better	 enforce	 these	 obligations.	 But	 it	 also	 raises	 the	 question	 of	
whether	the	President’s	positive	legal	procedural	obligations	are	nor-
matively	sufficient.	Is	it	legitimate	for	the	President	to	exercise	all	the	
power	she	is	delegated	subject	only	to	a	requirement	that	she	deliber-
ate	within	the	executive	branch	before	doing	so?	The	answer	is	likely	
“yes”	 for	some	areas	of	power,	but	no	for	others.	But	wherever	one	
comes	out	on	this	normative	question,	identifying	the	positive	duty	of	
deliberation	is	progress.	The	President	is	under	real	procedural	obli-
gations	before	exercising	power.	“Presidential	 law”	exists.	With	this	
knowledge	in	hand,	the	project	of	perfecting	it	can	begin.		
